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It is not because it is too profound, but rather because  










In realist theories of international relations, human nature is standardly classified as 
one of the three causes of war. In Kenneth Waltz’s famous tripartite distinction, 
human nature’s propensity to evil is catalogued as a first-image cause of war. 
However, Waltz himself seems to quickly dismiss first-image explanations of war as 
scientifically unreliable due to human nature’s complexity and inscrutability. 
Customarily, human nature explanations of conflict are criticised for resting on 
metaphysical assumptions and apriori pessimism. This paper argues that standard 
realist conceptions about the inherent evilness of human nature or, equally, 
reductionist sociobiological accounts of its hard-wired conflict-proneness are 
impoverished secularised versions of Christian anthropological assumptions 
grounded on the doctrine of original sin. Itself a widely contested dogma, in its 
Augustinian formulation original sin was linked to a soteriological perspective, that 
is, a defence of its status as a corollary to the doctrine that all human beings are 
equally in need of salvation in Christ. However, its use was never entirely 
disconnected from purposes of theodicy and Christian apologetics striving to 
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reconcile the co-existence of a benevolent and omnipotent God with the reality of 
evil and suffering in the world.  
 
It is this latter legacy -associated with the explanation of suffering and evil in the 
world but stripped of its eschatological content- that pervades secularist 
theorisations of human nature. Prominent part in this semantic transfiguration is 
played by a post-Augustinian understanding of human nature as the repository of 
passions, drives and vices that need to be tamed by an imposing human will 
representing the source of human personhood. As a result, natural human passions 
such as pain and suffering or the human condition itself, i.e. finitude and mortality, 
were seen as evil or punishment resulting from sin. With the eclipse of the 
eschatological dimension, human nature was gradually reduced to its physical, 
naturalistic aspects, equated with aggressive drives, and eventually autonomised as a 
causal explanation of conflict and human suffering. Initially conceived as a 
meditation on the paradox of evil and human responsibility, original sin ended up 
signifying man’s inherent wickedness. This paper will argue that even though the 
doctrine’s ambiguity permitted its naturalisation, the paradox at its heart rests on a 
fragmented theological anthropology inseparable from a redemptive dimension. 
International Relations will only hold impoverished notions of the role of human 
nature in international politics should it go on neglecting the complexity of a 
doctrine that was far from offering a reductionist vision of the human condition. 
 
Naturalising original sin 
 
In standard IR textbooks, ‘human nature’ is traditionally associated with realist 
explanations of war located at the level of the individual -the other two causes of war 
being regime type operating at the level of the state and anarchy characterising the 
structure of the international system (Donnelly 2000; Brown 2005; Burchill et al 
2009; Nicholson 2002). Kenneth Waltz’s (1959) Man, State and War is generally 
recognised as the inaugural statement of this classification. Through a sweeping 
perusal of the individual motivations that lead men to war in the history of political 
thought, human nature in Waltz’s text is typified as part of a tradition that 
attributes war to man’s evil inclinations. The idea here is not only that human nature 
is inherently wicked and bellicose but also that it is fixedly so, i.e. permanently and 
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unredeemably defective and unamenable to transformation, amelioration or 
salvation.  
 
In the course of his argument, Waltz (1959: 23) unquestionably assumes that the 
roots of this pessimist view on human nature can be found in the Christian tradition 
harking back to Augustine and his emphasis on original sin: ‘the act that accounts 
for the fact that human reason and will are both defective’. Here, Waltz rather 
clumsily lumps together a series of thinkers in that contrived tradition -from Luther, 
Hobbes and Spinoza in early modern times to Morgenthau and Niebuhr in the 
twentieth century. To say the least, these thinkers shared a rather disparate 
understanding of pessimism and the reasons behind human nature’s proclivity to 
evil. Waltz seems to suggest that Augustine inaugurates the tradition that leads to 
the identification of original sin with man’s primordial and inescapable wickedness. 
Yet, he doesn’t seem interested in making subtle distinctions as to what this 
statement implies in terms of the relationship between man’s moral agency, his 
biological nature and his worldly existence. For, it is one thing to foreground a 
tradition that is pessimistic about man’s ability to permanently secure peace and 
progress on earth, and quite another to attribute such an inability to metaphysical, 
transhistorical assumptions about human nature (Dienstag 2009a).  
 
Waltz’s treatment may, then, be seen as at the roots of caricature textbook readings 
of realist thought that abound in the discipline and tend to rely on this rather reified 
view of ‘what moves man’ (Freyberg-Inan 2004). The problem, however, runs deeper 
than a simple misinterpretation, misrepresentation or even misclassification for the 
purposes of advancing a scholarly agenda. It reflects the implications of the 
severance of the social sciences from its moorings in the history of political thought.1 
It also reflects the effects of what Mark Lilla (2007) describes as the ‘Great 
Separation’, the gradual secularisation of the study of social phenomena and the 
insulation of the study of political concepts from their provenance in non-secular 
discourses. Alastair McIntyre’s (1990) argument that we are condemned to live with 
                                                 
1 There are signs that the tides are changing on that front and that political and social theorists are 
beginning to grapple with the real complexity of modernity’s relationship to religion. To note just a 
few examples, see Charles Taylor (2007), Michael Gillespie (2008), Mark Lilla (2007), and Jean 
Bethke Elshtain (2008). For a good overview, see Rengger (2013). Of course, the greatest indicator of 
these trends is that even certain Rawlsians are trying to engage this conversation in new ways, most 
notably through the publication of Rawls' (2009) own undergraduate thesis, A Brief Inquiry into the 
Meaning of Sin and Faith, a work of Protestant theology.  
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fragments of traditions that are only minimally intelligible to us due to modernity’s 
radical change of paradigm is more than relevant here.2   
 
Unsurprisingly, then, Waltz is not alone in the history of international political 
thought in sanctioning such an illegitimate confluence. Carl Schmitt’s concept of the 
political can also be seen as resting on an interpretation of the original sin as fixed 
conflict-proneness. Schmitt (2008: 58) believes that there are two kinds of political 
theories: those ones that presuppose a conception of human nature as evil and take 
original sin seriously; and those ones that either gloss over this fact or deny it 
altogether imagining human nature as inherently good or positively malleable. 
Heinrich Meier (1995: 57) goes as far as to claim that ‘[o]riginal sin is the central 
point around which everything turns in [Schmitt’s] anthropological confession of 
faith.’ In this aspect, Schmitt is closely aligned with those Catholic authoritarians he 
so strongly admired, Bonald, Donoso Cortes and de Maistre, who seemed to think 
that human beings were essentially depraved and by nature evil. The implication 
here is that since human beings are inherently defective, institutions like the Church 
or the state are necessary to establish the sacred rule of authority. Original sin in the 
hands of those theorists becomes the political theology that protects human beings 
from their worst selves, from their propensity to cruelty, malice, lust and violence. 
The underlying assumption here again is not the one of the classical pessimist who 
would lament the tendency of all human constructions to decay, fail or simply 
become outdated and thus clash with a reality that is constantly changing (see 
Dienstag, 2009b). Rather, for Schmitt, this is a situation that cannot be redeemed or 
put right because human nature is perceived as being ontologically tainted, 
inexorably infected with a propensity towards conflictuality, animosity and 
wickedness.  
 
On the same note, in his latest book The Faith of the Faithless, Simon Critchley (2012: 
109) talks about what he calls the ‘naturalisation of original sin’ by scholars, like 
John Gray, who lament human beings for being natural killers. A fervent critic of 
liberal utopianism, Gray argues that the liberal faith in progress is a secularised 
                                                 
2 Although the diagnostic part in Lilla’s and McIntyre’s arguments is a fair description of the modern 
predicament, the implication that this is a positive thing (Lilla) or that we are condemned to choose 
(McIntyre) between two mutually exclusive options (Aristotle or Aquinas and Nietzsche) does not 
necessarily follow. On the contrary, as the subsequent analysis will show, a meeting of a certain kind 
of Augustinian and Nietzschean political theory might be possible. 
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version of Christian millenarianism. To his mind, they both failed and are both 
dangerous because they rest on the same misguided belief in human perfectibility. 
Human beings, rather, are naturally drawn to the idea that life must have a meaning 
and are, therefore, prepared to kill for it (Gray 2007: 263).3 Gray relies on Norman 
Cohn’s landmark study published in 1957, The Pursuit of the Millennium. Cohn’s book 
records the detrimental influence of the millenarian impulse on the development of 
Western civilisation in the form of violent political utopias, such as Jacobinism, 
Bolshevism and Nazism, that transposed the promise of salvation from the heavenly 
to the terrestrial terrain. For Critchley (2102: 115), Gray represents an example of 
what Nietzsche would describe as ‘European Buddhism’ since his pessimism about 
the possibility of realising high human aspirations submits to a form of passive 
nihilism breeding resignation and escapism. The important aspect for our purposes 
is that this refutation of all forms of utopianism does not rely on a type of pessimism 
that reads human achievements as fragile and transitory because they are temporal 
products susceptible to historical vicissitudes and unintended consequences. Despite 
his powerful critique of liberal humanism, Gray’s pessimism is animated by a reading 
of human nature that is pervaded by a transhistorical, permanent, almost 
metaphysical predilection to evil. Again, original sin is here read as an apriori 
naturalised incapacity of human beings to remedy their fate.       
  
A similar reductionist obsession with seeing nature as something hopelessly fixed 
towards conflictuality, a residue of the above reified conception of original sin, is 
expressed in certain twentieth century attempts to explain social dynamics through 
evolutionary theory. In the 1970s, sociobiology emerged as an explanation of human 
behaviour in terms of evolved genetic predispositions. Edward O. Wilson (1975: 4), 
the father of sociobiology, defined it as ‘the systematic study of the biological basis of 
all social behaviour.’ Indeed sociobiology as a sub-discipline of evolutionary theory 
explores how the social behaviour of animals, including humans, is shaped by natural 
selection at the genetic level (Degler 1991; Dupré 2001). This branch of 
evolutionary theory has inspired some scholars of international relations to revisit 
classical realist arguments about human nature setting aside Waltz’s concerns and 
investing their confidence in evolutionary science. Drawing on the wide cultural 
capital of biological sciences in the last half a century (Brown 1999; Bell 2006), these 
                                                 
3 On the long and illuminating history of resembling human beings to predatory primates, or ‘killer 
apes’, see Haraway (1989). 
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scholars seek to combine elements of rational choice theory with evolutionary 
arguments in an attempt to provide scientific evidence and intellectual legitimacy for 
claims that were previously considered anecdotal or impossible to ground.4  
 
This sentiment has been expressed, perhaps in the boldest manner, by Bradley 
Thayer in a 2000 article in International Security. In arguing that an interpretation of 
evolutionary theory can strengthen the realist theory of international relations, 
Thayer favours a type of realism which steps away from theorising structural 
determinations of global anarchy and re-appreciates the role of human nature as a 
constant in international politics. Following Wilson’s sociobiological turn and its 
latest incarnation in evolutionary psychology (Barkow et al 1992; Buss 2005; Pinker 
2002), Thayer argues that advances in the field of sociobiology offer an opportunity 
for reconciliation between the natural and social sciences. In particular, Thayer 
suggests that evolutionary science can offer a solid scientific ground for proving the 
validity of two central realist themes, natural human egoism and the drive to 
domination providing confirmation for a bellicose human nature. His thesis rests on 
two major claims, both arguably underpinned by sociobiological evidence. The first 
argument draws directly on evolutionary theory in claiming natural selection 
favours egoistic individuals over altruistic ones. A member of a species is relatively 
‘fitter’ in biological terms if it is better able to survive and reproduce than other 
members of the same community or species. For Thayer, this underscores the 
important concept of the ‘survival of the fittest.’ He suggests that since what is most 
important is relative, not absolute fitness, it is only logical to emphasise a 
competitive aspect to evolution within groups: ‘In a hostile environment where 
resources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their 
own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others’ (Thayer, 
2000: 131). Thayer relies here on an argument made previously by Shaw & Wong 
(1987: 6) that altruism and nepotism can be explained through the concept of 
‘inclusive fitness’ wherein natural selection favours specific genes that cause 
individuals to act on behalf of their gene pool (see also Dawkins 2006). Shaw & 
Wong use complex mathematical experiments to construct evolutionary models of 
human behaviour and explain it as a result of hard-wired biological processes. The 
                                                 
4 For an attempt to model international politics on an evolutionary paradigm, see Modelski (2008). 
For a sophisticated recruitment of evolutionary biology for turning IR into a process- and 
complexity-sensitive social science, see Bernstein et al (2000). 
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downside here, of course, is not the inclusion of biological parameters in social 
explanations per se but the reduction of social behaviour to genetic processes that 
justify domination and hierarchy (Hawkins 1997) or the use of biology to naturalise 
a politically conservative perspective (see Edwards 2003).  
 
It is not a coincidence that Thayer points to the ubiquity of hierarchical, alpha-male-
dominated social orders as contributing to fitness because the alternative would be 
perpetual conflict over resources. ‘Dominance hierarchies’, he argues, avoid conflict 
because weaker members submit resources to dominant members instead of 
engaging in costly conflicts (Thayer 2000: 133-4). Thayer suggests that survival in a 
hostile world produces a fear of ostracism and a desire for the protection of a group, 
and argues that conformity to a dominance hierarchy lowers conflict and keeps 
groups together. This, in turn, results in the clash of opposing hierarchical societies. 
Thayer’s purpose is to show how these two arguments combined demonstrate that 
universal biological impulses to protect limited resources favour xenophobia and 
ethnocentrism making ‘ethnic conflict, like war and peace...part of the fabric of 
international politics’ (Thayer 2000: 150). In this, he follows Wilson who had argued 
that war as we know it is the evolutionary result of a phenomenon known as kin 
selection. This refers to the particular selective mechanism whereby genetic relatives 
affect each other’s evolutionary fitness through interactions that make survival - of 
the relatives as well of the gene or trait encouraging such interactions - more likely 
(Thayer 2004). According to this logic, endemic conflict between ethnic groups can 
be traced back to Stone-Age adaptation processes that explain altruism and sacrifice 
as expressions of biological pressures for survival. 
 
Thayer’s work is symptomatic of a more or less pronounced tendency in neo-
sociobiological circles to oversimplify the goals of evolutionary science and conflate 
evolutionary theory writ large with some of the most controversial aspects of 
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. Apart from exaggerating the scientific 
consensus about neo-sociobiology within evolutionary studies, Thayer seems to have 
fallen victim to a functionalist explanation of social phenomena characteristic of 
organicist sociobiological approaches since the time of Herbert Spencer. These 
approaches tend to privilege ‘adaptionism,’ or ‘the attempt to understand all 
physiological and behavioural traits of an organism as evolutionary adaptations’ 
(Bell and McDonald 2001: 189). The problem is that the ‘givens’ of human nature 
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are drawn backward from common knowledge and truths about humans in society, 
and the game-theory experiments which seek to prove them are often created with 
such assumptions in mind. These arguments are seen by their critics as politicised 
from the very start. Lewontin et al (1984: 264), for instance, suggest that it ‘sets the 
stage for legitimation of things as they are.’  
 
Indeed, the danger inherent in arguments that incorporate sociobiological 
arguments into examinations of modern political life is that such arguments 
naturalise variable behaviours, support discriminatory political structures and 
legitimise social and political inequalities. Even if certain behaviours have biological 
or evolutionary foundations, labelling those behaviours ‘natural’ implies that human 
actors are programmed to adopt set patterns of behaviour that reduce human action 
to a species of utility maximisation or loss aversion. While the attempt to discover a 
genetically determined human nature has usually been justified under the argument 
that knowing humankind’s basic genetic make-up will help to solve pressing social 
problems, such a discourse about human nature seems to generate narrow visions of 
self-interest and self-fulfilling prophesies by putting limits on what is considered 
humanly possible or politically imaginable. While more sophisticated evolutionists 
tend to distance or guard themselves from the naturalistic fallacy,5 their ‘adaptionist’ 
approach to human nature shares a similar tendency to naturalise what is a 
conflictual anthropological perspective by way of conceiving it as a genetically 
ingrained destiny (see also Bell 2015).  
 
Free Will and Grace: original sin as theological anthropology 
 
What the aforementioned approaches hold in common is that they attempt to give a 
definitive answer to the riddle of ‘what human nature really is’ in order to remove 
the uncertainty surrounding the roots of human behaviour. In doing so, they seem to 
pursuit a path whereby a specific, violent and self-serving phenomenology of human 
action is transfigured into a biological and, therefore, unshakable ground of human 
nature. Although this kind of crude reductionism is rarely pronounced either in 
political theory, international relations or evolutionary psychology, the fact remains 
                                                 
5 See here Rosen (2004), Johnson (2004) and Johnson & Bering (2006). For insightful commentaries 
relatively well-disposed to the evolutionary turn in IR (albeit also offering cautionary notes), see 
Crawford (2009), Brown (2013) and Neumann (2014). 
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that human nature is overwhelmingly interpreted as some kind of ontological 
‘timber’ that is congenitally crooked, to paraphrase Kant. Far from constituting any 
proof of the empirical validity of the doctrine of original sin, such treatments of the 
human condition represent a fundamentally distorted and impoverished 
understanding of the human propensity to evil. Rather than surrendering to crude 
dualism, original sin as a theological concept originally developed out of Christian 
religious concerns with reconciling ontological monism –the idea that the world 
(and, within it, man as imago Dei) is created ‘very good’ (kala lian) (Genesis, 1:31), 
ontologically predisposed to salvation (similitudo Dei)- with ethical dualism -the idea 
that evil (the actuality of iniquity) is introduced in the world by man’s constitutive 
sinfulness (see Paipais 2015: 3). The latter challenge, of course is compounded by the 
experience of the recalcitrance of evil, i.e. the idea that evil is experienced as 
something that is always already there in the world even before human action, a 
condition Paul Ricoeur (2004: 278-9) described as the ‘realism of evil’. To bring 
clarity to what is often an obscure debate marking the boundaries of the relationship 
between the voluntary and the involuntary in human nature, one has to unpack a 
complex story.  
  
Original sin as a Christian doctrine did not emerge in the same form and with the 
same intensity on both sides of the Christian world, Eastern and Western 
Christianity. While some early traces of the doctrine can be located in the work of 
North African bishops like Tertullian and Cyprian, original sin did not take its 
systematic doctrinal form of inherited sin until Augustine’s anti-heretic diatribes 
(Duffy 1988; Couenhoven 2005). What primarily concerned previous theologians, 
such as Tertullian, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Athanasius in East and 
West was the idea of the constitutive sinfulness of the human being in need of 
salvation by the incarnate Logos, Jesus Christ, who assumed humanity in order to 
enable the divinisation of human beings.6 Salvation was conceived as more than the 
restoration of what has been lost in the first Adam: it incorporated what had been 
achieved by the second Adam (ho deuteros Adam), the bridging of the gap between 
created and uncreated nature and the possibility of man’s divinisation (not by nature 
but by adoption) through imitatio Christi. Clarifying, therefore, the conditions of the 
                                                 
6 For the Greek fathers, perhaps as a critical reaction to Platonism, divinisation is not an achievement 
of the philosophical soul but a work of God’s grace through Christ’s Incarnation. In the famous words 
of Athanasius (On the Incarnation and Against the Arians, 8): ‘The Son of God became the son of man so 
that humans, the children of Adam, might become children of God’. 
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transmission and propagation of man’s original corruption were not necessarily the 
doctrinal or pastoral priorities of those early Christian fathers. Rather their main 
objective seemed to be to differentiate the new faith from the fatal attraction 
exercised by the dominant philosophical and cosmological doctrines of the era, Neo-
Platonism and Christian Gnosticism with their anti-Biblical emphasis on the soul’s 
divine kinship and the body’s inferior status, in the case of the former (see Louth 
1981), and on evil as a physical reality, a cosmological principle that infects from 
outside, in the case of the latter (Jonas 1992). The early Church fathers were anxious 
to establish that salvation is not the negation of the material existence of this world 
(contemptus mundi) but requires conversion from sinful existence (fuga mundi as an 
escape from Satan’s reign) (see Delumeau 1990: 11-12). 
 
In effect, their main purpose was to reconcile the Jewish and Biblical origins of the 
new faith with the Hellenistic philosophical environment of late antiquity. The 
central issues were the scope and nature of human freedom and the degree of its 
dependence on divine grace for the salvation of human beings from the fatal grip of 
sin and death. Human beings were considered fallen, sinful, ignorant and weak by 
the Greek and Latin fathers of the first three Christian centuries but their emphasis 
was not on providing an explanation for such a plight. They rather focused on 
proclaiming the end of human misery through the redemptive role of Jesus Christ as 
judge, embodiment of divine law, and bestower of true life and union with God (see 
Duffy 1993: 44). In Clement of Alexandria (ca.150-215) the doctrine of an inherited 
sin that binds humanity in a biological solidarity in damnation is largely absent, 
while Irenaeus of Lyon placed sin in history and conceived of the Fall as gradual 
contamination with evil due to the inevitability of personal sin, not to a specific 
change in human nature itself (Wiley 2002: 54). How then does the doctrine of 
original sin find its peculiar concatenation of juridical debt and biological inheritance 
that is traditionally associated with? Paul Ricoeur thinks it has to be attributed to 
the anti-Pelagian impulse behind the motivation of Christian apologists that led to 
the eventual resurgence of quasi-Gnostic tendencies in the doctrine’s conceptual 
elaboration. As he puts it, ‘the concept of original sin is anti-Gnostic in its basic 
purpose but quasi-Gnostic in articulation’ (Ricoeur 2004: 267). The central figure in 
whose work this apparent contradiction is vividly expressed is the father of the 
doctrine in its systematic form, St Augustine.   
     
 Page 11 of 31 
 
According to the classical formulation which the bishop of Hippo bequeathed to 
posterity -as opposed to his earlier, and occasionally different, views on the matter- 
original sin consists of a culpable disorder of the will which caused Adam proudly to 
rebel against God (DCD 14.11). According to standard Christian theodicy that 
precludes the divine as the cause of evil, God did not create or cause this 
rebelliousness in man; it rather originated entirely within the voluntas of the first 
parent and resulted in his fall: ‘For this sin, which is imputed originale, would not 
have existed without the work of free will, with which the first man sinned -through 
whom sin entered the world and passed on to all men.’ (Contra Julianum Pelagianum 
6.10.28, PL 44. 838). Taking the actual sin and fall of Adam literally, Augustine 
taught the solidarity of the entire human race in the person of the first father: when 
he sinned, so did all men (DCD 13.14).7 Every individual, accordingly, shares in the 
sinful lust of the flesh against God and against the spirit due to the sexual 
concupiscence in which everyone is conceived. No one escapes such concupiscence, 
neither the chaste and married nor the adulterous, neither baptized Christians nor 
infidels since the sinful essence of the concupiscence itself determines the nature of 
the offspring thereby conceived (De nuptiis et concupiscentia 2. 21.36). Therefore, no 
one that is born of that union which cannot be completed without shameful lust is 
free of sin.  
 
Despite false impressions that Augustine is here advocating a Platonic diminution of 
the body, the root of primal sin is not carnal desire but the unruly state of the soul. 
Augustine argues that disobeying a direct command from God when life was so 
blessed would be thinkable only for those who had already begun to be proud in 
their inner hearts (Gn.Litt. XI. 30.39; C.Jul.imp. I.71). Eating the fruit, then, was 
merely the external manifestation of an evil will prior to the evil act. And yet, if life 
in Paradise was so idyllic whence this evil will? Augustine admits here of the deeply 
irrational character of primal sin: instead of an efficient cause, Augustine writes with 
rhetorical flair, sin has a ‘deficient’ cause (DCD 12.6, 7, 9). Yet, the primal sin was so 
great that there was a radical change for the worse in Adam’s nature, and thereby in 
                                                 
7 The argument of Augustine’s mistranslation of Romans (5:12) is widely accepted in patristic studies. 
In his anti-Pelagian fervour Augustine, who could not read Greek, used Ambrosiaster’s Latin Vulgate 
edition that translated the Greek ἐφ ὧ πάντες ἥμαρτον (‘because (or as in as much as) all have sinned’) 
as in quo (‘in whom all have sinned’). Instead of grounding human solidarity in sin through inclusion 
in Adam’s loins, the original Greek focused more on contrasting Adam’s deed that brought death into 
the world with life now offered in Christ.  
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the nature of the entire human race (De nupt.et conc. I.32.37). And yet, this connection 
between primal sin and personal sin was made by earlier Christian fathers as well 
without, however, this committing them to a doctrine of original sin as inherited 
corruption. Theophilus of Antioch, Justin Martyr and Irenaeus all affirmed man’s 
inclination to evil, yet for them human beings fall into personal sins as they grow up 
because Adam’s sin weakened his progeny and exposed them to temptation. 
Augustine, however, pursues a more radical view, arguing against the Pelagians that 
infants need to be healed by Christ, not because of their potential to sin, but because 
they have inherited original sin. Obviously, such a position gives rise to problems. 
Augustine appears to undermine his own anthropological explanation of evil, when 
to counter the Pelagian excesses he concedes that sin is a hereditary taint 
congenitally transmitted.  
 
For Duffy (1988: 607) and Ricoeur (2004: 273-4) the apparent contradiction between 
responsibility and inevitability appears largely due to Augustine’s mixture of 
categories: a juridical category of debt, which concerns deliberate and therefore 
punishable acts, and a biological category of inheritance, which concerns species 
unity through propagation. Augustine directed the juridical category against the 
Manichaeans, as he insisted on the separation of the beginning of creation from the 
beginning of evil; and the biological category against the Pelagians, as he insisted on 
a pre-volitional solidarity in evil grounded in procreation, which, of course, resonates 
with Platonic tendencies to incriminate bodily existence. The latter transmuted the 
Hebraic experience of Israel’s captivity under sin grounded on an interpretation of 
sin as a collective or corporate act (Cantley 2012) into sin as a hereditary vice carried 
by every individual by way of its participation in Adam’s seed. Thus the doctrine 
appeared incoherent, though its central insight -that the bondage of the heart to evil 
is self-imposed and that freedom and inevitability, individuality and solidarity are 
paradoxically related rather than starkly contradictory- is profound. Eventually, the 
stock explanation of inherited guilt and corruption resulting from the inclusion of all 
of us in Adam’s loins made the classical doctrine hard to distinguish from its Gnostic 
rival, for sin appeared as an intrinsic and inescapable dimension of the human 
condition for which no one is or can be liable (see also Forsyth 1987).  
 
That said, Ricoeur insists that there is a deeper insight revealed in Augustine’s 
weaving together of the juridical category of imputation and the procreational 
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category of inheritance. Augustine’s concerns remain soteriological aiming at 
grounding God’s work of salvation on his gratuitous offering of the gift of grace 
(Bonner 1993: 84-89). This step is taken in his meditation on Romans 9:10-29 where 
the attention is no longer Romans 5 and the opposition of two figures, Adam and 
Christ, but God’s arbitrary conferral of His favour: ‘I loved Jacob and I hated Esau’. 
To justify the act of Esau’s condemnation, Augustine has to shore up the justice of 
Jacob’s election, so Esau must be conceived as carrying the guilt even before his 
birth. The justice of the one’s election demands the symmetry of the other’s 
reprobation (Ricoeur 2004: 275). Even if, strictly speaking, Augustine’s teaching of 
predestination may sound hopelessly Gnostic, it still remains faithful to the mystery 
of evil; the fact that evil is there even before we choose it and that we stand almost 
impotent to eradicate it because it resides in the darkest involuntary of the human 
heart. Augustine’s youthful insight that nusquam nisi in voluntate esse peccatus remains 
true and firmly anti-Gnostic but his own experience of the obstinacy and 
irreducibility of evil drives him to a soteriology that threatens human freedom and 
revives the persistent Neoplatonic and Christian Gnostic elements in his thought: 
the association of sin with sexuality (concupiscence ambiguously identified with 
carnal desire) and the insistence on a form of knowledge (gnosis) that in order to 
serve theodicy may entail a demoralising fatalism (Duffy 1993: 106-15).  
 
Freedom, necessity and hope: original sin as philosophical anthropology 
 
If Augustine’s anti-Pelagian militancy towards the end of his life led him to a 
dangerous proximity with the Gnostic dogmas of his youth, the legacy of the 
doctrine he bequeathed, and whose emblematic formulation he was responsible for, 
was marked by the implications of his assertion that Adam and Eve’s sinful 
transgression in paradise descends to all subsequent human generations as a literal 
inheritance.8 Central to the modern criticism of Augustine’s description of sin as a 
literal inheritance has been a key distinction between nature and history; between 
birth as a quintessentially involuntary and generically animal event, and culture as a 
distinctively human realm of free and rational activity. Birth, in this view, represents 
a kind of pole in the progress of the individual from unreasoning slavish immersion 
                                                 
8 The transition from a concern with original sin as the general situation of mankind to that of the 
relationship between the sin of Adam (peccatum originale originans) and the sin of humankind (peccatum 
originale originatum) that attracted so much opprobrium from modern thinkers is usually considered 
intensified and solidified in post-Tridentine theology (see Wiley 2002: 91 and Sesboüe 2004: 15).  
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in the processes of nature (necessity), to identity as a fully individuated, fully human, 
fully rational being (freedom).  
 
Arguably, the seminal roots of this division between an inert nature and a 
controlling human will as the source of personhood can be traced in Augustine’s 
doctrine of the will (McFarland 2010: 75-79).9 Whereas in his anti-Pelagian treatises 
Augustine seems to defend an overbearing conception of grace phenomenally in 
opposition to human freedom, what he is really rejecting is the Pelagian 
understanding of the will as a power of choice, as a controlling centre of personhood 
presiding over a detached human nature which it rules. Augustine insists that by 
separating the will from nature and making it a source of action over and above the 
nature in which it is found, his Pelagian opponents, such as Julian of Eclanum, 
render willing not an expression of one’s nature –as it is held in the patristic 
tradition from Gregory of Nyssa to Maximus the Confessor- but a kind of 
unaccounted force operating independently of it (see Mühlenberg 1993: 109-12). 
And yet, although Augustine’s mature theory of the will rejects the Pelagian 
autonomisation of the will, his entanglement with the Pelagian controversy 
eventually caused an imperceptible displacement of his position. In refining his 
account of the relationship between post-lapsarian will and concupiscence, he raises 
the possibility of a split within the self whereby the ‘I’ who unwillingly covets sinful 
acts is distinct from the ‘I’ who wills to obey God’s law. Augustine’s inaugural 
gesture can be seen as setting in motion a long process that eventually led to the 
disjuncture between a rational human will, obeying God’s commands, and a ‘gnomic 
will’ that reflects the human capacity to choose (see also Taylor 1989). As a result, 
human willing assumed the status of an independent capacity of human beings to 
distinguish themselves from their nature, whereby the latter is reduced to an 
ontological reservoir of passions, drives and other rampant desires that the operation 
of the will is there to control (rational will) or abide by (gnomic will).  
 
One of the Augustinian masters of twelfth-century theology whose Sententiae became 
a degree requirement for medieval doctors of theology (McCord Adams 1999: 18), 
Peter Lombard, reflects this growing distinction in his Christology. Lombard drives 
                                                 
9 The analysis in this paragraph draws on McFarland’s excellent book on original sin and his 
juxtaposition of Augustine’s and Maximus the Confessor’s outlooks on the relationship between 
human nature and will. 
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a wedge between personhood and human nature in his effort to defend the reality of 
Christ’s humanity. He argues that Christ’s person could not sin since, in its 
hypostatic union with the Divine Word, the former is God eternally and necessarily. 
However, he adds, if Christ’s human nature were not united to the Divine Logos, it 
could sin like any other human nature. Here human nature is already considered 
capable of sinning apart from its hypostatic expression in human will. This gradual 
autonomisation of nature (with will as its controlling centre) in Lombard’s 
distinction between Christ’s person and Christ’s human nature is further confirmed 
in his subsequent separation of rational (affectus rationis) from sensory affections 
(affectus sensualitas) in the constitution of the human will itself (McCord Adams 1999: 
23-4). In that way, a division is established within the human will between rational 
and sensual human emotions with the former reflecting the true self’s coercive 
authority over the latter’s unruly tendencies. The will is no longer the τρόπος 
ὑπάρξεως (way of existence) of a specific nature but the controlling master of an inert 
and inherently rebellious nature. It is exactly this understanding of the relationship 
between human nature and will that lies behind Lombard’s denial that Christ merited 
a passible human nature: Christ, he insists, was not subject to its changes necessarily, 
but only voluntarily for our sake. Even though Lombard’s intentions are perfectly 
orthodox in trying to show that Christ assumed a real as opposed to a phantom 
body, capable of experiencing the sufferings of mortal flesh (pain, hunger, death), and 
a real soul capable of experiencing real emotions (sorrow, stress, fear), he still seems 
to assume that passibility is a mark of our fallen nature rather than of our 
creaturliness. Lombard seems here to miss the patristic lesson that it is not human 
suffering and passibility as such that causes distress but only our sinful disposition to 
it (our resulting unhappiness out of guilt).  
 
Albert Hirschman’s (1977) The Passions and The Interests was pivotal in 
demonstrating how this sensibility that separated human nature from will and 
reduced human passions to expressions of unruly vices in need of control and 
repression, was a central motif in early modern thought encountered in thinkers 
such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza and Hume. The idea of rational interests as 
countervailing passions that would suppress and harness ‘man’s evil impulses’ 
(Hirschman, 1977, 30) appears as the next stage in the story of the separation of a 
rational enlightened will from an evil nature that reveals ‘what man really is’. The 
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subsequent typically Enlightenment narrative of the priority of the morally 
responsible individual that remains accountable despite her occasional relapses, and 
only to the extent that her actions can be recognised as voluntary, developed in 
opposition to any subordination to blind necessity or involuntary impulses deriving 
from human nature. In fact, only the former was recognised as the expression of true 
personal identity and the source of moral autonomy and accountability. Within that 
model, criticisms of an inheritable original sin have always been implicitly, and often 
explicitly, part of a broader argument concerning the justice of God’s providence and 
the carving out of space for human freedom within a framework of modern theodicy 
that rejects natural determinism grounded on human nature or natural evil (see 
Jeffery 2008). Even admitting that such a thing as inheritable sin were possible, a 
good God, a God whose justice is commensurate with the expectations of 
autonomous moral reason, would not, indeed could not, punish the heirs of Adam 
and Eve for a sin they did not themselves voluntarily commit.  
 
This modern consensus on the limits of responsible interpretation of the doctrine of 
original sin has been most representatively exemplified in the work of the 
enlightener par excellence, Immanuel Kant. The idea he defended is that inheritable 
sin cannot be reconciled with the necessarily voluntary and individual conditions of 
just moral accountability, and so must be excised from any account of the enduring 
truth of the doctrine. Otherwise, the possibility of meaningful and just moral 
accountability is undermined and obscured. For this reason, in his solution to the 
problem of evil caused by sin as posed by the traditional formula, the opposition 
between the natural and the rational, between birth as an event marked by total 
immersion in natural processes, and reason as a realm of unconditioned free activity, 
reaches a remarkable extreme. Of the notion of the literal inheritance of sin, Kant 
remarks with disdain: 
 
Whatever, the nature, however, of the origin of moral evil in human being, of all the 
ways of representing its spread and propagation through the members of our species 
and in all generations, the most inappropriate is surely to imagine it as having come 
to us by way of inheritance from our first parents. (Kant 1998: 62) 
 
Kant objects so strenuously to the description of sin as an inheritance because it so 
obviously, in his view, confuses the realms of the voluntary and the involuntary; 
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because justice in moral attribution depends, above all else, on clarifying the 
distinction between these two realms. To this end, Kant posits an extraordinary 
disjunction between the temporal and the transcendent as integral to human moral 
identity. To his mind, the ineptitude of the traditional formulation of the doctrine is 
its failure to appreciate the inscrutable mystery of the transcendence of human 
freedom. Utterly unconditioned volition alone, Kant emphatically explains, is the 
measure of justice in attribution: 
 
Moreover, to have the one [i.e. good] or the other [i.e. evil] disposition by nature 
as an innate characteristic does not mean here that the disposition has not been 
earned by the human being who harbors it, i.e. that he is not its author of it, but 
means rather that it has not been earned in time (that he has been the one way or 
the other always, from his youth on). The disposition, i.e. the first subjective ground of 
the adoption of the maxims, can only be a single one, and it applies to the entire use 
of freedom universally. This disposition too, however, must be adopted by the free 
power of choice, for otherwise it could not be imputed. (Kant 1998: 50) 
 
So Kant refuses to accept that we stand at an equal distance from nature and reason. 
Our ‘propensity to evil’ (Hang zum Bösen) cannot be attributed to our biological or 
psychological nature but it is something brought upon us by ourselves. As Kant 
(1998: 56) puts it, there is a ‘radical innate evil in human nature’. At first glance, the 
claim that there is an intrinsic taint in human volition seems to contradict Kant’s 
emphasis on the priority of human autonomy -a philosophical idea Kant served all 
his life- as it might suggest that when we act immorally we can’t be held responsible 
because we don’t act as free moral agents (Kant 1998: 62). Kant’s solves the paradox 
by bringing into full conceptual fruition a distinction that has been in gestation long 
before him, that one between ‘will’ (Wille) in the sense of our rational moral capacity 
to obey the categorical imperative and ‘will’ (Willkür) as the expression of our power 
of choice (see Dews 2013: 23). By doing so, Kant hopes to eschew the implication 
that our debility or perversion of the will is part of our natural endowment -despite 
the fact that we are forced to accept it ‘as if’ it is natural (Kant 1998: 57-8). Such a 
conclusion would revive the possibility that the tendency to violate the moral law is 
inescapable and thus would resurrect the danger of freedom submitting to natural 
determinism that the distinction between Wille and Willkür sought to unravel in the 
first place.     
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And yet, Kant is arguably confronted with an impossible conundrum. On the one 
hand, he is keen to puncture contemporary illusions about an innocent ‘state of 
nature’ inducing human beings to a perpetual course ‘from bad to better’ (Kant 1998: 
45). On the other hand, he wants to escape the implication that human beings are 
equally caught in a Manichean struggle between natural desires and the constraints 
of morality. Like in Augustine, evil is real but it does not have substance, rather it 
finds its origin in perverse human will. However, if the human power of choice 
towards evil is powerful and pervasive as to be tantamount to something inborn, 
how can the portrayal of evil as freely chosen be sustained? If evil is indeed 
ineluctable as ‘the multiple of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds 
parades before us’ (Kant 1998: 56), how can the vision of man’s moral autonomy be 
vindicated or, even more so, how can a being corrupted at its root repair the damage 
solely through an act of the same will? (Kant 1998: 38) Eventually, caught in a bind 
between freedom and necessity, Kant finds himself compelled to concede that 
conversion to morality is a Herculean task that justifies the idea of a supersensible 
postulate. In a telling analogy to Augustine’s reference to man’s spontaneous 
conversion through the gift of grace which is the work of God’s love, Kant seems 
here to allow a role for divine grace. Allen Wood (1970) has even regarded it as 
Kant’s ‘fourth postulate’. The problem with such a concession however is that such 
an explicitly religious concept does not chime very well with Kant’s insistence on the 
priority on human autonomy and the unaided character of human freedom. In all 
earnest, Kant (1998: 183-4) is essentially trying to square the circle when he states 
that there are no other means for a human being to become worthy of divine 
assistance: 
 
Except the earnest endeavour to improve his moral nature in all possible ways, 
thereby making himself capable of receiving a nature fully fit –as it is not in his 
power- for divine approval, since the expected divine assistance itself has only his 
morality for its aim. 
 
In effect, Kant here proposes a mystery as solution to a puzzle. It appears that the 
only possible way to reconcile the fact of sin with the rational conditions of moral 
accountability is to posit a profound disjunction at the core of human identity. As 
solution to the problem of justice in accountability posed by the traditional 
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formulation of the doctrine of original sin, Kant’s proposal is formidable, but also 
symptomatic of any attempt to investigate the meaningfulness of the doctrine 
‘within the boundaries of mere reason’: better to imagine the will in such 
metaphysical isolation, than allow that God would ever impute sin to a person where 
rational criteria of accountability do not hold; better to imagine the self as 
unconditioned rational will, transcending even the event of one’s own birth, than 
allow the injustice of imputing sin where such will is not present. 
 
Finitude and original sin: nuancing human nature 
 
As it seems, both theological and philosophical anthropologies of ‘man’s innate 
propensity to evil’ are overdetermined by the priorities of some form of theodicy or 
apologetics, Christian or humanist. The reality and intractability of evil is taken 
seriously but, to avoid laying the blame at God’s doorstep or denying man’s rational 
nature, a complex dialectics of freedom (voluntas in Augustine, rational will (Wille) in 
Kant) and hope (grace and predestination in Augustine, grace and providence in 
Kant) is offered in place of the acceptance of evil as a cosmological or philosophical 
first principle. What is, however, imperceptibly conceded in both cases is the 
unexamined designation of meaningless suffering as an evil in need of justification. 
What this ‘naturalisation’ of suffering accomplishes is an unquestioned equation of 
evil and human finitude to the extent that suffering cannot be accepted as the fate of 
human beings’ mortal and created nature but has to be explained away as part of a 
general scheme of things that justifies it. The key to unpacking the secular and 
theological theodicies behind the problem of evil’s origin and nature, then, is to 
understand its reliance on an understanding of suffering as meaningless and, 
therefore, in need of justification. This is the true meaning of Nietzsche’s aphorism 
that it is the ‘meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering as such, [that] was the 
curse that lay over mankind so far’ (Nietzsche 1967: 162). The upshot here is not 
that suffering as such is suffering devoid of valuation but rather that the experience of 
suffering should be open to value ascriptions and attitudinal dispositions. Taking 
meaningless suffering to be apriori evil presupposes that ‘suffering as evil’ is accepted 
as an ontological given of the human condition which then authorises the need for its 
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justification.10 What this understanding of the human condition forecloses is the 
possibility to read suffering not as evil but as part of the facticity of human finitude 
open to meaning imputation.11  
 
In Augustine, this tendency is expressed in his conflation of the nothingness of 
man’s evil inclination (defectus) with the biblical nothingness of the creation of the 
world from nothing (creatio ex nihilo). Augustine’s Neoplatonic prejudices do not 
really make it easy for him to sustain the difference separating the nothing of 
creation (finitude) from the nothing of deficiency (sin). The anti-Pelagian 
controversy only helped to accentuate this conflation by posing a corrupted nature 
carrying a hereditary vice in stark parallel to the positivity of evil in the Gnostic 
myth. On the other hand, in Kant’s anthropology, evil’s recalcitrance is registered as 
man’s innate propensity to evil but finitude (man’s limitations as a created being) is 
never seriously taken into account. The individual’s rational nature is outside history 
which means that there is no real risk involved in the journey of the realisation of 
human freedom. To be sure, history’s vicissitudes and contingencies are recognised 
but only as part of Nature’s hidden plan leading to an ever perfect world (Kant 
1991). Kant’s philosophy of history explains how the human fall into evil proves 
ultimately beneficial by providing the motor for advance towards the full 
institutionalisation of freedom (Dews 2013: 36). The contradiction of man’s 
finiteness and freedom is glossed over in Kant because he has skilfully taken real 
human beings out of the equation and has replaced them with the image of rational 
humanity struggling against its evil inclinations (Molloy 2013). However, it is 
exactly such a move that pits human beings against their nature as Kant’s seems to 
be contrasting the epoch of nature which is led by private vices and the pursuit of 
self-interest with the epoch of freedom which will inevitably follow once humanity 
overcomes its self-imposed alienation (Wood 1999: 296). The barriers separating 
human finitude from human vice are again dangerously blurred.          
                                                 
10 The Book of Job stands as the opposite example wherein a just man is overwhelmed by suffering 
with no apparent justification. See also the Johannine account of Jesus’ encounter with the man born 
blind in which He refuses to associate the man’s misfortune with his sins or the sins of his parents 
(John, 9:1-4) or the story of the victims of the tower of Siloam and that of the Galileans massacred by 
Pilate (Luke 13:2-6). For the Christian narrative such confusion between guilt, death and suffering is 
characteristic of the demonic capacity of sin to conceal its binding power.  
11 For an excellent analysis of how the Christian doctrine of creation from nothing undermines the 
equation of suffering, pain and the apparently pointless destruction of creatures through natural 
disasters or the struggle for survival with evil, see McFarland (2014: 77-8, 129-31). McFarland 
convincingly argues that the unity of creation ‘groaning in labour pains’ is a corollary of the belief in 
one God who creates from nothing rather than an empirical judgement. 
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Given the intricacies of the matter, it is not a coincidence that among the IR 
Augustinian realists it is a theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, who possessed the 
theological skills to discern its implications. An excellent theologian despite his own 
doubts (see Gilkey 2001), Niebuhr (1953) consciously resists this imperceptible 
conflation of createdness and sinful existence and, instead, calls for what he dubs 
‘modified Augustinianism’. Niebuhr (1941: 178) explicitly argues that the Christian 
doctrine of original sin rests on a particular interpretation of ‘the contradiction of 
[man’s] finiteness and freedom.’ This is hardly surprising given that attentiveness 
to the perils of exercising freedom under the conditions of finitude was perhaps his 
most consistently dwelled upon concern. By emphasizing the temptation that 
precedes sin -that there is a situation or context for it- Niebuhr (1941: 244) was 
attempting to hold two positions in tension with one another: the inevitability of sin 
and man's responsibility for it. Indeed, Niebuhr was critical of Calvin and especially 
Luther for denying free will ‘to the point of offering man an excuse for his sin’. And 
so, similarly, Niebuhr (1935: 55) was a persistent dissenter from the notion that 
original sin is an inherited corruption, because ‘its inheritance destroys the freedom 
and therefore the responsibility which is basic to the conception of sin’. Following 
Kierkegaard, Niebuhr insisted that sin posited itself, but does not have an actual 
history of origins. To give evil a history is to evade responsibility for it, to passively 
consign not just its origins, but the burden of accountability for it, to some juncture 
in the distant past. This does not mean that the sin of past generations does not 
weigh on contemporary men but, here, Niebuhr is closer to the Hebraic biblical 
tradition of corporate sin as captivity (Israel’s Babylonian experience) than the 
Augustinian notion of hereditary taint.  
 
Niebuhr argues, then, that the temptation to sin, though not sin itself, is always 
before us in the situation of our finitude and freedom, with the notion of temptation 
symbolised in the presence of Satan in the Garden of Eden. For Niebuhr, the 
importance of Satan, the serpent as the agent of temptation, was that it preserved the 
basic integrity of the human situation in the sense that sin was not merely due to 
man’s finitude -to be finite is not to be evil: ‘The devil fell before man fell, which is to 
say that man’s rebellion against God is not an act of sheer perversity, nor does it 
follow inevitably from the situation in which he stands’ (Niebuhr 1941: 180). There 
is an evil antecedent to any evil human action; temptation must intervene before our 
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situation gives rise to sin. We do sin inevitably, but not directly because of our 
situation of dwelling at the juncture of nature and spirit. That finitude and freedom, 
for Niebuhr, are the two elements of man’s situation means that man is peculiarly 
aware of his finitude not as a necessity ontologically opposed to his freedom but as 
an opportunity or condition of possibility to orient his existence towards God (or 
not). The looming temptation is to see our finitude not as a condition of possibility 
(limitation) for our freedom but as an impediment (limit) to our freedom and 
capitulate to its necessity (see Paipais 2013: 857).  
 
The upshot here is that Niebuhr wishes to avoid an ontological dualism whereby 
man, simply by being involved in the flux of nature and having a particular body and 
being bound to time and place, is sinful. Indeed, Niebuhr thinks we are both our 
genetic impulses and our ability to transcend them but the two do not constitute the 
human being as a two-layer composite. True to the Christian anthropology of man 
as imago Dei, Niebuhr rejects a facile nature/spirit dualism or an existential 
superimposition of ‘spirit’ over ‘nature’. Without denying its genetic make-up, he 
views the human being as an ongoing spiritual project where ‘integration into the 
realm of mind and spirit transforms all biological elements constituting the human 
person’ (Duffy 2005: 219). Human nature is not our genetic imprints in isolation but 
the way mind and will repress, redirect and sublimate them into actions and choices 
that set humans apart from other animals. Evil, greed and violence then are not 
direct results of intractable genetic impulses towards selfishness as some neo-
sociobiologists would have it (Dawkins 2006, 1982) but complex bio-cultural 
configurations that merely reflect the destructive (evil/sinful) capacity of human 
beings to be held captive by their own incarnate desires (see Mulhall 2005: 84). Yet 
the latter, far from being the result of a stubbornly recalcitrant nature, constitutes an 
expression of our nature as unruly drive for domination that manipulates both 
biology and environment. In its restless transcendence, the human animal can defy 
both blind nature and reason’s prudence. Therein lies the source of human beings’ 
both tragedy and magnificence (Niebuhr 1941: 122).     
 
Even if Niebuhr’s formulations may not always escape the entrenched vestiges of an 
inert natura pura, his lesson is that we do not need to naturalise evil or man’s 
propensity to wrong-doing to take demonic or bellicose tendencies in man seriously. 
Evil’s intractability is always already there not because we are condemned to be evil 
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but because we are condemned to be free (freedom here meaning not freedom from 
our nature but freedom from the security-seeking impulses stemming from our 
finiteness). The question remains, however, whether Niebuhr’s theological 
anthropology, in trying to escape false historicism or integralism (an uncritical 
recourse to Scripture and/or tradition), accords proper significance to the 
sacramental or eschatological approach to original sin that puts anthropology on an 
equal footing with Christology. What is at stake here is not whether Niebuhr strays 
from Christian orthodoxy but whether a proper understanding of original sin 
requires placing it within the parameters of the operation of grace through Christ’s 
work of salvation. In essence, the real question emerging is whether the classical 
theme of original sin is only open to the experience of faith with Christ and whether 
this experience can escape the epistemological monopoly of Christian apologetics or 
‘political Augustinianism’ with its fatalistic implications.  
 
Sensitive to this dimension, Ricoeur builds on St. Paul’s (Romans 5: 12-21) figurative 
interpretation of Adam as Christ’s antitype to expose the structure of hope at the 
heart of the symbol of original sin (see also Delumeau 1990: 247). Ricoeur (2004: 
279, 282) shows how the ‘absurd concept’ of original sin stands for an anthropology 
posed by default (without an objective content), drawing on the one hand on the 
experience of regeneration achieved in Christ and, on the other hand, on the 
universalisation to all humankind (the original Adam) of the experience of salvation 
had by the Israelites. Freed from theodical (to salvage God) or rationalist (to salvage 
human reason) priorities, original sin tells the story of human nature as an ongoing 
project manifesting the paradoxical structure of hope: ‘as if in an unfathomable depth 
dimension, at the core of the disposition towards the good, one could no longer 
distinguish between the identity of human effort and the gift of another’ (Ricoeur cf. 
Theobald 2004: 122).12 The paradox of human freedom and evil’s inevitability is here 
highlighted under the messianic mystery of trust in Christ’s regenerative power. 
God’s silence or hiddenness and Christ’s weak messianic power are signs of love and 
respect for human freedom and a way of healing the evils of this world through His 
absolute trust to His creation. Christ’s agapaic vulnerability becomes a therapeutic 
                                                 
12 It is here that Christian soteriology meets with the Nietzschean heterodox project in saving us 
from an essentialist conception of ourselves as fixed or innately perverse. As Nietzsche’s aim is to 
open up the possibility of our existing otherwise, so too the doctrine of original sin already 
incorporates this dimension: ‘in showing us to be originally sinful, Christ simultaneously shows that 
our sinful nature can be overcome or reborn, and hence reveals our fallenness as contingent, as no 
longer necessary’. (Mulhall 2005: 44) 
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resistance to the evil generated by human freedom that, at the same time, operates as 
an affirmation of the forces of resistance inherent in the world since its creation. 
Human beings discover that the gift of creation, including human nature, despite all 
negative experiences, is ‘no ‘poisoned chalice’ but, in fact, contains the possibility for 




The doctrine of original sin in its original formulation rested on a complex dialectics 
of will and grace itself obeying the priorities of Christian theodicy and apologetics. 
Inherently unstable, as it tried to reconcile two contradictory experiences -i.e. the 
recalcitrance of evil in the world and man’s responsibility for it (sin)-, it was 
subsequently appropriated by modern philosophical anthropology itself struggling 
to define the relationship between human freedom, necessity and hope. If its 
theological expression cannot be understood apart from its soteriological context, its 
philosophical reformulation equally obeyed the priorities of Enlightenment 
philosophies of history akin to secular eschatologies (Löwith 1949). Both theological 
and philosophical anthropologies share an interest in rationalising (and therefore 
mythologising) a concept that was rather meant to express humankind’s paradoxical 
condition as both free and bounded. In that sense, any attempt to wrest the concept 
of original sin of its complexity and semantic surplus is bound to trivialise it or 
render it ‘false knowledge’ as human beings’ creaturely, rather than ethical, inability 
to overcome innate imperfection. Original sin should rather be read as a symbol of an 
irreducible tension within human nature between transcendence and immanence, 
freedom and necessity, hope and mundaneness. Such an understanding refuses to 
reduce the paradox of original sin to the parody of man’s evil nature.  
 
International Relations stand only to benefit from a political theological account of 
the origins of man’s conflictual tendencies given the stakes involved in such an 
enrichment of our theoretical and political imagination. I have shown that it is 
crucial to revisit the fragmented theological tropes behind contemporary 
anthropologies and concomitant philosophies of history precisely because these 
tropes are not readily legible as theological anymore. On the one hand, mainstream 
realist and liberal accounts of the causes of war are plagued by a secularised, yet 
diluted, theological anthropology that authorises the mythic politics of 
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sovereignty/security as protection from a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’. Indeed, the 
entire modern paradigm of security is premised on a Schmittian conception of 
politics as the reproduction of enmity and the regulation of insecurity that scholars 
like Brad Evans (2013) have aptly called ‘liberal terror’. On the other hand, the 
recent turn to sociobiology and evolutionary psychology in IR is promising to the 
extent that age-old dualisms, such as mind/body and nature/culture, are put to 
scrutiny and deconstructed to reveal the dynamic nature of human action and 
motivation. However, residues of a resurrected reductionism and a biological 
determinism of sorts have not disappeared. The temptation to see human nature as 
aggressive, rapacious and indelibly prone to violence or resort to sociobiological 
explanations that operate as scientific confirmation of anthropological pessimism and 
authorize the techniques of the modern liberal apparatus of biopolitical security 
remains persistent. 
 
In contrast, understanding that the source of evil lies not in man’s natural 
wickedness but in man’s freedom permits two paradoxically inseparable insights: the 
root cause of human troubles is not our mortality, finitude, materiality or biological 
make-up but our search for security from the contingencies of our natural condition, 
finitude. That said, the second valuable insight is that realising that we are the 
authors of our sufferings may demystify the source of evil in the world but does not 
explain its recalcitrance and inevitability away. And yet, evil may be inevitable but 
it’s not necessary. Human nature is not condemned to be evil; it is rather condemned 
to be free to either embrace creation, with all its fragility, as a gift and a promise 
(belief) or seek a self-defeating flight from insufferable vulnerability (unbelief). 
Original sin stands as the symbol of that predicament which is at the same time the 
condition of possibility for the exercise of human freedom, responsibility and 
judgement. A political theological reading of human nature, then, uncovers the 
surplus semantic potential enclosed in a concept such original sin and offers a richer 
conception of human nature beyond the confines of anthropological pessimism 
and/or evolutionary naturalism. In this outlook, pace Wight (1948: 33), hope is 
properly recognised, not as an otherworldly theological virtue or the prospect of an 
abstract utopia in the future, but as the messianic counterpart to original sin echoing 
the patristic lesson that the enigma of human nature can only be illumined from the 
eschatological perspective of redemption as an ever-present historical possibility 
through the therapeutic practice of love.   
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